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Taking Shareholders’ Social Preferences 
Seriously: Confronting a New  
Agency Problem 
Adi Libson 
Oliver Hart, Nobel Laureate in Economics for 2016, and 
economist Luigi Zingales recently published an article justifying 
companies’ pursuit of social objectives at the expense of profits from 
within the shareholder primacy framework. This Article highlights an 
important consequence of this approach: a new agency problem between 
managers and shareholders regarding social preferences. This Article 
provides two possible solutions to this agency problem: a bottom-up 
solution focused on shareholders’ ability to submit proposals on such 
issues and a top-down solution based on an independent board sub-
committee intended to identify social objectives and forward them for 
shareholder approval. 
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What should the objective of a corporation be? Should it focus exclusively on 
maximizing profit, or should it promote other purposes, such as environmental 
sustainability and social justice? This Article aims to emphasize the ramifications of 
opting for the latter possibility: the new set of agency problems it generates, and 
how they can be addressed. 
The standard justification for promoting social objectives is the stakeholder 
justification: many other stakeholders exist besides shareholders, such as workers, 
lenders, and the community and society at large, and it is legitimate, and sometimes 
imperative, that the corporation guide its actions in light of the interests of these 
other stakeholders, rather than solely according to the interests of shareholders.1 
Recently, an article by 2016 Nobel Laureate Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales justified 
corporations’ pursuit of social goals independent of the stakeholder justification, 
 
1. One of the earliest proponents of the stakeholder view was Merrick Dodd, in his well-known 
dispute with Adolf Berle, the chief proponent of the shareholder primacy view. See E. Merrick Dodd, 
Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Adolf Berle, For Whom 
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). A new wave in support of 
the stakeholder view rose in the 1980s, in response to the takeover wave of the 1980s in the United 
States. See R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on 
Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 189 (C. Huizinga ed., 1983); see also R. EDWARD 
FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984). The stakeholder theory 
of corporate law became a common topic for legal symposia in the early 1990s. See Brian Langille & 
Ronald Daniels, The Corporate Stakeholder Conference: Introduction, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 297 (1993); 
David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993). Scholarship in support of the stakeholder view 
continues to be published to this day. See Justin Blount, Creating a Stakeholder Democracy Under Existing 
Corporate Law, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 365 (2016); Iris Chiu, Operationalising a Stakeholder Conception in 
Company Law, 10 L. & FIN. MKTS. REV. 173 (2016); Thomas A. Kochan & Saul A. Rubinstein, Toward 
a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm: The Saturn Partnership, 11 ORG. SCI. 367 (2000); Lynn A. Stout, Bad 
and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002). 
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reinvigorating the debate regarding appropriate objectives for a corporation.2 The 
authors argue that even if one accepts the shareholder primacy view—that the 
objective of the corporation should be maximizing shareholder welfare, and 
disregarding the interests of any other stakeholders—firms should not necessarily 
pursue maximization of profits exclusively. Given that shareholders may have social 
preferences besides maximization of profits, their welfare would be maximized only 
if those preferences were also taken into account by managers and the board.3 As a 
result, maximization of shareholder welfare necessitates the promotion of social 
objectives at the expense of profits.4 
This Article points to the consequences of accepting such a view—that 
management should pursue social objectives when shareholders have such 
preferences. It argues that there exists a systemic gap between managers and 
shareholders regarding social preferences. While shareholders may be willing to 
prioritize social preferences over profit maximization and sacrifice the latter for the 
former, managers are less inclined to do so. Managers are much more sensitive to 
profits than shareholders. This is for two reasons. The first is the nondiversification 
of managers relative to shareholders. While shareholders are diversified in their 
investments, with only a small portion of their physical capital typically invested in 
one specific corporation, managers’ investments in the corporations they manage 
are less diversified. Managers’ most valuable asset—human capital—is solely 
invested in the corporation they manage. The market value of their managerial skills 
is directly linked to the financial bottom line of the corporation.5 
The second reason why managers are more sensitive to profits than 
shareholders is bonding mechanisms, such as options and bonuses. Many managers 
have such personal financial incentives, which increase their sensitivity to the 
profitability of the corporation relative to shareholders.6 
Because of this systemic gap between managers and shareholders, a 
corporation’s decisions that have a significant impact on social matters, such as 
environmental implications, should be delegated to shareholders to approve. While 
Hart and Zingales discuss the need for delegation due to the possibility of a gap in 
 
2. Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market 
Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017). 
3. Id. at 249–50. 
4. As Hart and Zingales note, id. at 251, a version of their central argument has been previously 
made. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 740, 
796 (2005). For a discussion of where their argument and the argument in this Article departs from 
Elhauge, see infra Part IV.A. 
5. For empirical evidence supporting the effect of past performance on CEO compensation, 
see Rajiv D. Banker et al., The Relation Between CEO Compensation and Past Performance, 88  
ACCT. REV. 1, 4 (2013); D.H. Chen et al., Executives and Employees: Comparison and Interaction of 
Incentive Effectiveness, 5 MGMT. WORLD 160 (2015). 
6. Their sensitivity to bottom line earnings may even be, in some instances, too strong, increasing 
the likelihood of financial misreporting. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without 
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 18 (2005); Peidan Hong, The Literature 
Review on Compensation System Design, 8 MOD. ECON. 1119, 1124–25 (2017). 
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the preferences of managers and shareholders,7 this Article—based on the systemic 
gap in preferences—emphasizes the urgency of this delegation. In addressing this 
urgent need, this Article offers two methods through which decisions on social 
issues can be delegated to shareholders: a bottom-up model, through shareholder 
proposals, and a top-down model, through an independent subcommittee on the 
board that would delegate decisions regarding significant social issues to 
shareholders. 
It is worth noting that this agency problem is also relevant to the stakeholder 
view of the corporation; managers may bend toward profit maximization even if it 
does not serve the interest of any stakeholders, including the shareholders. Yet, the 
problem is much more acute in the context of Hart and Zingales’s argument for 
two reasons. The main reason is the dominance of the shareholder primacy view in 
U.S. legal discourse.8 As a consequence, Hart and Zingales’s argument brings this 
agency problem into the forefront of corporate policymaking. The second reason is 
that the stakeholder view of the corporation has agency problems woven into its 
basic structure: the corporation is supposed to benefit certain stakeholders that have 
no control over its decision-making process. Under such a framework, identifying 
an additional agency problem with shareholders is nearly superfluous. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines Hart and Zingales’s argument 
in favor of corporations engaging in pro-social initiatives from within the 
shareholder primacy framework. Part II underscores the new agency problem that 
arises between managers and shareholders if a corporation is supposed to pursue 
social objectives in addition to financial objectives. Part II elaborates on the two 
sources for this new agency problem: nondiversification of managers’ human 
capital and the bonding mechanisms that make them too sensitive to the financial 
 
7. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 249–50. 
8. The Delaware Supreme Court, which, in regards to corporate law, is the highest court of the 
most important jurisdiction in the U.S., in which around half of U.S. corporations are incorporated, 
seems to have accepted the shareholder primacy view. It had stated that “[t]he board of directors has 
the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholder 
owners.” Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998). In Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., it held that “concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active 
bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to 
sell it to the highest bidder.” Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 
(Del. 1986). It is true that even the Delaware Supreme Court has also permitted directors, in some 
cases, to take decisions that seem to diverge from shareholders’ interests and benefit other 
constituencies at their expense. See e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1140 
(Del. 1989). Yet, as Lynn Stout has pointed out, they have done so using shareholder primacy rhetoric, 
hoping that, in the long-run, it will also benefit the shareholders in some ways. See Lynn A. Stout, supra 
note 1, at 1203. Many other scholars hold that the dominant view of the corporation’s purpose in the 
U.S. is shareholder oriented, a view originally stated by Adolf Berle. Berle, supra note 1; see Ronald Chen 
& Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 32 (2004); Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance 
Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 72 (2010); Michael C. Jensen, Value 
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 8-
9 (2001). 
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bottom line of the corporation. Part III presents two forms of addressing this new 
type of agency problem: the bottom-up form that enables individual shareholders 
to make proposals on social issues, and the top-down form that establishes an 
independent sub-committee on the board that identifies significant social issues and 
delegates decisions on such issues to shareholders. Part IV discusses possible 
objections to this analysis and proposed solutions. Part V concludes.. 
I. THE CASE FOR INCLUDING SOCIAL OBJECTIVES AS A NORMATIVELY 
DESIRABLE OBJECTIVE OF THE CORPORATION 
One of the fundamental questions regarding the purpose of a corporation is 
whose interest the corporation is supposed to pursue. There are two schools that 
provide an answer to this question. One view claims that corporations should 
promote shareholder interests.9 The corporation is their property, as they provided 
the capital to finance its initial activity.10 In addition, because shareholders are the 
residual claimants—receiving their financial gain after other claimants such  
as lenders and workers—those claimants’ aims are served by prioritizing 
shareholders.11 
The second school claims that corporations should promote the interests of 
other stakeholders besides shareholders, such as workers, lenders, and even society 
at large.12 One of the central arguments behind this claim is that equity is only one 
input among many necessary for the corporation’s success, such as workers, lenders, 
markets, development of human and physical resources by society, and so on. Thus, 
there is no justification for corporations promoting the interests of only one 
stakeholder that provides resources to the corporation—namely, the 
shareholders—and not those of other contributing stakeholders.13 
The first school has mostly dominated economic and legal scholarship. 
Professor Milton Friedman has provided the most prominent formulation of the 
view..14 Friedman argued that shareholder primacy and profit maximization were 
inextricably connected. His central argument was a division of labor argument: even 
if shareholders might have social objectives other than profit making, they could 
 
9. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 2–5 (1991); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); Berle, 
supra note 1. Friedman presented his views more sharply in a New York Times article: Milton Friedman, 
Editorial, A Friedman Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17. For the adoption of this view by courts and other scholars, see supra note 8. 
10. Berle, supra note 1, at 1370. 
11. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 36–39. 
12. For examples of scholars supporting various versions of the stakeholder view, see supra  
note 1. 
13. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85  
VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999). 
14. FRIEDMAN, supra note 9. 
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pursue those objectives elsewhere. The corporation maximizing profits would only 
increase their ability to pursue other social objectives elsewhere.15 
Hart and Zingales’s central aim is separating the shareholder primacy view 
from Friedman’s maxim that corporations should strive to maximize profits. They 
claim that given that shareholders have other social preferences, maximizing 
shareholder welfare necessitates the corporation to pursue these social 
preferences.16 Confining the corporation to pursue only some of the shareholders’ 
preferences will lead to a suboptimal welfare level for shareholders.17 
Hart and Zingales contest Friedman’s argument that these social preferences 
could be pursued outside the corporate context. They note that some ethical 
activities are inseparable from corporate money-making activities, and thus 
shareholders will only be able to pursue these social preferences in the corporate 
context.18 This inseparability mostly stems from technological constraints: pursuing 
some objectives requires technology that the corporation has and the individual 
could not obtain without great cost.19 
The central example provided is the shareholder derivative action Trinity Wall 
Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in which Walmart shareholders aimed to curb the 
company’s sales of high-capacity assault rifles.20 The corporation’s restrictions on 
sales of both guns and ammunition would clearly serve plaintiff shareholders’ 
preference to reduce the number of gun deaths in the United States. A shareholder 
likely would not have a cost-effective alternative to confront the problem. The 
meager amount of resources from the shareholders’ proportional share of the 
company proceeds from the sale of this weapon cannot be employed in any other 
significant way that would promote gun control. As further illustration, a 
corporation’s pollution of a stream may not only cost a substantial amount to 
restore, but consumers might not be able to completely offset the damage done by 
the corporation.21 
The alternative and more conventional method for the promotion of social 
goals—governmental spending and regulation—may also be ineffective in many 
cases. There may be political economic limitations that prevent the government 
from acting in certain spheres or even constitutional limitations that do not exist in 
the corporate sphere. For example, in Trinity Wall Street, gun and ammunition 
 
15. Id. at 114. 
16. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 249. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 250. 
19. Other scholars have also considered the possibility of non-separable activities. See Ronald 
Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility, 77 Economica 1, 11–12 (2010); 
Elhauge, supra note 4. Regarding other barriers facing the consideration of shareholder preferences, 
such as institutional investors that seem to stray away from the preferences of shareholders in their 
voting pattern on social shareholder resolutions, see Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43  
J. Corp. L. 217, 218 (2017). 
20. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015). 
21. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 249. 
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manufacturers may have an effective lobby for preventing legislative gun control,22 
and the Second Amendment constitutionally limits gun control legislation.23 
Restricting sales of weapons and ammunition on the corporate level may be the 
most effective way to reach those results. 
Affirmative action may serve as another example demonstrating the efficacy 
of promoting social objectives at the corporate level, relative to state action. A 
corporation may adopt a policy in which minorities and/or women are preferred 
for certain jobs. Prioritization based on race or gender as an additional factor in the 
hiring process may impose costs for the corporation under certain circumstances, 
relative to decision-making based on maximization of revenue alone.24 Yet, aside 
from the lighter constitutional limitations regarding race and gender affirmative 
action in the private sphere relative to the public sphere, a state-imposed affirmative 
action policy may engender racial tensions rather than work to move past them. In 
contrast, private policies in the corporate context are less likely to elicit such strong 
concerns.25 Furthermore, in extreme cases in which the social purpose of 
affirmative action is not only promoting numerical equality across racial groups but 
also enhancing the social stature and self-esteem of certain groups, such bottom-up 
action may be much more effective than top-down affirmative action mandated by 
the state. The enhancement of the minorities’ self-esteem may be much more 
limited because it was imposed on employers to hire them. In contrast, in the private 
corporate context, the affirmative action was adopted voluntarily and as such 
reflects more appreciation and respect toward the individual, enhancing his self-
respect and self-esteem to a greater degree.26 
If a shareholder wishes to promote a certain social objective at a certain cost, 
and if the most effective way to promote that objective is through corporate action, 
restricting the ability of the corporation to promote that objective decreases the 
shareholder’s welfare level. If the overarching objective of the corporation is the 
maximization of shareholder welfare, the corporation should be permitted to 
 
22. Regarding the power and influence of the rifle lobby, see: JOSH SUGARMAN, NATIONAL 
RIFLE ASSOCIATION: MONEY, FIREPOWER & FEAR 27 (1992). 
23. For an example of a case in which the Supreme Court found a gun-safety regulation violating 
the second amendment and struck it down, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008) 
(striking down a D.C. gun-safety regulation that required all rifles and shotguns to be kept unloaded 
and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock because it determined that it violated the second 
amendment). 
24. For an argument regarding the economic costs of affirmative action, see RICHARD  
A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
396 (1992). Yet, there are scholars who disagree with the position that affirmative action in the 
workplace will always impose a cost. See, e.g., Harry J. Holzer & David Neumark, What Does Affirmative 
Action Do?, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 240, 250–53 (2000). 
25. Regarding the private/public distinction that applies to affirmative action at the workplace, 
see Rebecca K. Lee, The future of Workplace Affirmative Action After Fisher, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597, 
612–18 (2016). 
26. Regarding how the context in which a right or resource is conferred or given to an individual 
impacts her dignity, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 310–
26 (1999). 
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promote its shareholders’ social preferences and not necessarily required to 
maximize profits. 
In Hart and Zingales’s modeling of the argument, the corporation must decide 
between two courses of action: whether to adopt a pro-social strategy, which they 
label in the environmental context as the “clean” strategy for which the expected 
profits are πclean; or a “dirty” strategy, in which the expected profits are πdirty, given 
πdirty>πclean.27 The dirty action will impose an external cost for society that equals 
d.28 A shareholder’s determination of whether the dirty strategy is worth more than 
the clean strategy is determined by a weighted average of the private payoff and the 
social cost. The model therefore hinges on the weight a shareholder attributes to 
the impact of the action on society relative to his private gains from the investment. 
The model assigns weights of λi for the social impact and (1 - λi) for the private 
payoff given that by definition. Those weights will sum to 1 and 0< λi<1.29 Both 
payoffs are also affected by the investor’s investment in the corporation (i.e., the 
fraction of shares he holds, which is denoted by α1). As a result, a shareholder’s 
payoff from the dirty action is weighted as follows:30 
(1) (1 - λi) α1 πdirty + λi α1 (πdirty - d) = α1 (πdirty - λi d) 
The parallel payoff from the clean action is:31 
(2) (1 - λi) α1 πclean + λi α1 πclean = α1 πclean 
Hart and Zingales conclude, therefore, that a shareholder will prefer clean over dirty 
if:32 
(3) πclean > πdirty - λi d 
The main point of their model is to demonstrate why a rational agent may 
prefer the clean strategy, even though it generates a lower personal payoff. It is 
important to note that they limit the model to a certain type of payoff. Hart and 
Zingales distinguish between decision payoffs and final payoffs: the payoff from 
the active decision, which is not necessarily equal to the final payoff the agent 
derives from the outcome of the decision.33 The main source of difference between 
the two is the shareholder’s sense of responsibility: the sense of responsibility may 
decrease his perceived payoff when making the decision, even though it has no 
effect on the final outcome. Hart and Zingales assume that their model applies only 
to decision payoffs when a shareholder feels responsible for a social cost. In 
contrast, for final payoffs, the investor does not feel responsible for the social cost 
and thus does not internalize or weigh it at all (i.e., λi = 0).34 The central motivation 
for this problematic distinction is to explain why there may be an “amoral drift”—
 
27. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 252–53. 
28. Id. at 252. 
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tilting the corporation toward the dirty action, even when for most shareholders, 
πclean > πdirty - λi d.35 This is because individuals with a lower λi could take over the 
company by paying a higher price per share and shifting it toward a dirty course of 
action that would increase profits. In Hart and Zingales’s framework, even though 
shareholders typically internalize social costs and would prefer the clean action in 
their decision payoff corporation, they may not be inclined—in a tender offer—to 
internalize the acquirer’s likely preference for the dirty option and are willing to sell 
their shares for the high price the acquirer is offering.36 
The next Part will refute the need for this problematic distinction to explain 
the disconnect between corporations’ dirty actions and shareholders’ preferences 
for clean actions. It will underscore a more systemic mechanism that will tilt 
corporations toward dirty actions, even with no risk of a potential takeover. 
II. THE NEW AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES 
The last section has presented the argument for permitting corporations to 
promote social objectives. Attributing such function to corporations gives rise to a 
new agency problem. There is a systemic and significant gap between managers and 
shareholders in the context of social preferences. Shareholders have a greater 
tendency to prioritize social preferences over profit maximization, while managers 
will have a tendency to prioritize profit maximization instead. The reason for this 
is that managers are much more sensitive to profits than shareholders. While 
managers’ benefit from social objectives is similar to that of shareholders, managers’ 
personal gain from every incremental increase in profits is much greater than that 
of shareholders. Because managers have to forgo a greater amount of gain for the 
same social benefit, they are more averse to promoting social preferences than 
shareholders. As a consequence, even in cases in which shareholders are willing to 
promote a social objective at the expense of profits, the corporation’s managers 
may not implement the social objective even though it would maximize shareholder 
welfare. 
Why should managers be more sensitive to profits than shareholders? There 
are two reasons for this: the nondiversification of managers relative to shareholders 
and the bonding mechanisms that apply to management. 
A. Nondiversification of Managers Relative to Shareholders 
Most shareholders are diversified in their ownership of stock. Unlike 
shareholders, though, the most valuable asset of managers—their human capital—
is nondiversified. Its value is pegged, to some extent, to the performance of the 
corporation they manage. The value of their managerial skills on the market is 
 
35. Id. at 255. 
36. Id. at 256. Hart and Zingales are aware of the problematic distinction between shareholders’ 
calculation of decision payoffs and final payoffs, and they have a separate section in which they justify 
the distinction. See id. at 266–70. 
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strongly influenced by the financial bottom line of the corporations they have 
managed.37 For shareholders, a decrease of the profits of the corporation is a 
decrease in profits of one corporation out of the many that they hold in their 
portfolio.38 For managers, though, the decrease in the profits of the corporation 
has a much more significant impact on their financial condition and welfare. Thus, 
management is likely to be more averse to promoting social objectives.39 
For example, let us assume that a manager’s future earnings depend on their 
corporation’s relative past performance in its sector. Their expected compensation 
will increase by the same percentage the earnings of their corporation surpassed 
average earnings.40 Let us assume that the corporation needs to decide whether to 
spend $2 million to reduce pollution in their production process. If it spends the $2 
million, it will have net profits of $10 million, and if it does not, it will have net 
profits of $12 million. Excluding the past-performance component, the manager’s 
expected future compensation is $1 million. If the average corporation in the sector 
posted $10 million in profits, the company’s spending on pollution reduction will 
make the manager ineligible for the performance bonus. Instead of $1.2 million due 
to the past-performance component, their future compensation will be limited to 
$1 million. The manager’s significant loss of 16.67% of their expected future 
compensation will cause them to object to such spending. This is true even if the 
manager is not planning to leave their present job; their expected compensation in 
alternative positions will impact their bargaining position in their present job.41 
B. Bonding Mechanism 
One of the central mechanisms for addressing the conventional agency 
problem—rooted in the managers’ preference for leisure over work in contrast to 
the shareholders’ preference that the managers should work in order to maximize 
profits—is through bonding mechanisms. In order to incentivize the manager to 
put the corporation’s interests first, bonding mechanisms that increase a manager’s 
 
37. See supra notes 5–6. 
38. Since a study that demonstrated that a portfolio can reach 95% of the market’s 
diversification by holding 32 stocks, most investment managers have compiled a portfolio of a 
minimum of 30 stocks. See Lawrence Fisher & James H. Lorie, Some Studies of Variability of Returns on 
Investments in Common Stocks, 43 J. BUS. 99, 117 (1970). In reality, most investors are even more 
diversified, as they hold ETFs that enable them to be fully diversified relatively cheaply. 
39. Regarding how the nondiversification of managers in comparison to shareholders may 
cause them to diverge from shareholder preferences, see Guido Ferrarini et al., Executive Pay: 
Convergence in Law and Practice Across the EU Corporate Governance Faultline, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 243, 
251–52 (2004). 
40. Regarding the practice of benchmarking relative to peers, see Charles M. Elson & Craig  
K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups, and Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38  
J. CORP. L. 487, 491 (2013). 
41. The effect may be even more pronounced under a “winner takes all” compensation scheme 
that rewards the leading manager in the sector with less sensitivity to the absolute level of earnings. In 
such a context, even smaller spending may have a more significant impact on expected compensation 
if it determines whether the manager is leading in his sector or not. Regarding the prevalence of this 
compensation scheme, see Ferrarini et al., supra note 39, at 251–53. 
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sensitivity to the success of the corporation have been introduced: options and 
bonuses for reaching certain targets.42 
When designing such bonding mechanisms, the main objective is to ensure 
that managers will have greater investment in the financial performance of the 
corporation. There is typically no concern that managers might be too sensitive to 
the corporation’s financial performance: the greater managers’ sensitivity, the 
better.43 This situation changes, though, when shareholders’ social preferences are 
accounted for. In such a scenario, there may be a situation in which a manager’s 
concern with the financial outcomes is too strong. Options and bonuses create 
powerful incentives and extreme sensitivity to profit levels. In some cases they may 
generate “cliffs”: if profits cross a certain point, the manager receives a windfall, 
but if they do not, even barely, the manager gets nothing.44 In the case of bonuses, 
an increase of a dollar in a corporation’s revenue may increase a manager’s bonus 
by far more than a dollar.45 
For example, let us assume that a manager is offered a bonus of $100,000 if 
they pass a threshold of $10 million of revenue per quarter. Assume that the 
marginal cost of every unit sold is half of its price. If revenue has crossed $9.85 
million, the additional revenue of $150,000 will increase the manager’s 
compensation by $100,000 while generating a net loss for the corporation: an 
increase of $75,000 in profits ($150,000 in revenue minus direct costs of $75,000) 
and the payment of the $100,000 bonus to manager. Given their incentives, the 
manager will be overly eager to increase sales, and may use environmentally “dirty” 
techniques, such as having salesmen driving door to door and increasing the fuel 
 
42. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 
98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 226 (1990). Regarding optimal design of payment for performance, see Bebchuk 
& Fried, supra note 6, at 19–23. 
43. There have been some claims that incentives for managers to generate profits may be too 
strong in respect to managing earnings. See supra note 6. There has also been some concern that 
performance-based payment may provide strong incentives for the short-run at the expense of the long-
run. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 6, at 18. But the point here is not that the incentive provided for the 
short-term may be too strong and at the expense of long-run incentives, but that performance-based 
incentives may be too strong in general. 
44. Regarding the excessive risks of cliffs that will misalign managers with stockholders, see 
Yisong S. Tian, Too Much of a Good Incentive? The Case of Executive Stock Options, 28 J. BANKING & 
FIN. 1225, 1225 (2004) (arguing that when option wealth exceeds a certain fraction of total wealth, 
adding more options only decreases incentives to increase stock price); Zhiyong Dong et al., Do 
Executive Stock Options Induce Excessive Risk Taking?, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2518, 2518 (2010) 
(arguing that options may induce managers to tilt toward debt finance, even when it is a suboptimal 
finance structure for corporations and shareholders). 
45. Even though this form of compensation means that a certain increase in revenue may cause 
a net loss to the company, it may still be an efficient form of  compensation. Similarly to “tournament 
theory,” it is possible that the most efficient form of  compensation is one in which the employee 
receives a sum above his marginal product. See supra notes 39 and 41. Similar to a lottery, there may a 
low likelihood of  reaching a certain threshold. Providing compensation for reaching a threshold that is 
greater than the marginal product is a powerful incentive to the employee to increase productivity, even 
though a smaller increase in productivity will not qualify for any bonus. 
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consumption of the company, even though shareholders want the company to 
become greener and consume less fuel. 
This is an extreme illustration, one in which managers are extremely sensitive 
to an increase in their corporation’s profits. This does not necessarily have to be 
the case in order for the gap between the interests of managers and shareholders to 
take place. It is sufficient that the managers’ interest in increased profits is 
significantly higher than stockholders’. Consider Company ABC, which has one 
million shareholders, and the value of each shareholder’s stock is $10. All 
shareholders have a portfolio of $10,000, thus the value of their stocks in ABC 
constitutes 0.1% of their portfolio. The board offers the manager 1,000 stock 
options; each option enables them to buy 100 stocks of the company for $12 a 
share. The strike date for the options is one year from when they receive the options, 
and they cannot sell the options to a third party. These options will be valuable only 
if the value of the corporation increases by over 20% in one year. If it does, the 
manager will be entitled to approximately 9% of the value of the increase over 
20%.46 
ABC faces a decision: whether to shift to using a cleaner form of fuel. Shifting 
to the cleaner fuel will impose an additional cost of $500,000. The new manager 
expects to increase the value of the corporation by 30% in a year, increasing its value 
by $3 million. If the company decides to use the cleaner fuel, the expected increase 
in the value of the corporation will be only $2.5 million. The expected financial 
implication of such a decision would be halving her bonus: from an expected 
$90,000 to an expected $45,000. This is a very strong financial impact for her, 
especially if the bonus is a large component in her compensation package. Thus, the 
manager will be strongly against the decision to shift to the cleaner fuel, although 
she may have general sympathy to environmental issues. The financial price she 
would have to pay to promote the environmental cause is just too heavy. 
The situation is different for shareholders. They too will pay a financial price 
for the environmental decision to move to clean fuel. Their expected gain will 
decrease from 29.1% to 24.55%. They will bear an effective decrease of 46¢ in the 
value of the stock of the company they hold. The effect of such a decision on their 
portfolio would be meager, decreasing its value by 0.0005%. Even if both managers 
and shareholders value environmental issues to the same extent, their preferences 
 
46. In case they exercise the options, there will be 1.1 million shares. If the value of the 
corporation is 12 million dollars, exercising the option has no economic impact on existing 
shareholders: their stake in the company has been reduced by the value of the company that has been 
increased proportionally by the proceeds the company received for the stock. Existing shareholders 
“pay a price” for the exercising of the options proportionate to the increase of the stock over the strike 
price of the option. For every marginal dollar increase in the stock’s value over 12, they will bear a cost 
of 9 cents for exercising the options: the company does not get anything for the value of the stock 
above 12. A portion of the increase in value, which originally would go only to existing stockholders, 
will have to be shared with the party exercising the options: only 91 percent of it will go to original 
shareholders (1 million from the 1.1 million current stocks of the company). The other nine percent 
will accrue to the party exercising the options. 
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here will diverge if the value they attribute to such policy is in the wide range 
between 46¢ and $45,000, as shareholders will prefer to switch while managers will 
prefer not to switch. 
It should be noted that in most cases, the value gap between shareholders and 
managers is not as large as described above. The shareholders’ preference to opt for 
the green option is not relevant only to Company ABC but also may be relevant to 
other companies that form part of their portfolio. Thus, the real cost for the 
decision to opt for clean fuel is not only 46¢. As this decision may pertain to many 
other companies in their portfolio, the cost may be substantially higher. Yet this 
point does not alter the analysis above. Even if cleaner fuel were relevant to all the 
companies in their portfolio, the cost of opting for such an option across all 
companies would be $455. This is still a much smaller number than the $45,000 cost 
to the manager. And in reality, the cost for shareholders with diversified portfolios 
will never reach this amount, as any individual issue and its inseparability from 
business activity is unlikely to be relevant to all corporations. In any case, this 
example clarifies why there is a systemic gap between managers and shareholders 
regarding their willingness to trade off a corporation’s profits for a social objective. 
In terms of Hart and Zingales’s model, the argument above could be modeled 
in the following way. Its key point is that there are two types of λ: λi—the weight 
investors attribute to social costs—and λm—the weight managers (and other insiders, 
including board members) attribute to social cost. The weight is not identical to 
individuals in both spheres, but the weight of the latter is typically higher than the 
weight of the former: 
(4) λ 	 λ  
As equation (3) demonstrates in the Hart-Zingales model, α does not have an 
effect on the decision whether to opt for the dirty or clean course of action because 
it equally impacts the payoffs of both courses of action. This will make it simpler to 
compare to the decision of a manager and his affiliates, who are not impacted 
directly by the shares he owns. So, for modeling the decision of the manager and 
his affiliates, we use only λ and omit α. The model for the decision facing the 
manager, similar to that of the investor in equation (1) above, will be  
(5) (1 - λm) πdirty + λm (πdirty - d). 
As a result, even in instances in which the investor would prefer a clean course of 
action, i.e., 
(6) πclean > πdirty - λi d, 
the manager and his affiliates would prefer the dirty course of action. This is 
reflected in equation (4), from which it could be derived that 
(7) λi > λm, 
and as a result, it is plausible, although not necessary, that 
(8) πdirty - λm d > πclean > πdirty - λi d. 
In other words, managers and their affiliates would choose the dirty course of action 
even though investors would choose a clean course of action. 
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In order to achieve this result—the inherent likelihood that managers and their 
affiliates may resist social policies preferred by shareholders—there is no need for 
the distinction made by Hart and Zingales between decision payoffs and final 
payoffs and no need to focus solely on cases in which there is a potential takeover. 
This result applies to all corporations, more generally than Hart and Zingales have 
claimed in their model. 
III. ADDRESSING THE NEW AGENCY PROBLEM 
Enabling corporations to promote the social preferences of their shareholders 
will require overcoming this agency problem of managers that are systematically 
reluctant to pursue such policies. The best solution for overcoming the problem is 
delegating decisions that involve potential social implications to shareholders.47 This 
Part will discuss how this should be done. 
While suggestions to delegate decision-making on social matters to 
shareholders have been made and partially discussed by Hart and Zingales,48 the 
systematic gap between managers and stockholders underscored in this Article turn 
these suggestions from mere possibility to necessity. This delegation is not worth 
considering because there may be differences between managers and stockholders; 
the systemic gap requires shifting decision-making on these matters from managers 
to shareholders. 
Delegation of decision-making on social matters is the only effective way to 
address the agency problem that arises in the context of these matters. Other 
vehicles for mitigating this agency problem will not be as effective. When faced with 
the conventional agency problem between shareholders and managers, the vehicles 
lawyers, industry actors, and scholars have proposed are legal duties—such as the 
duties of loyalty;49 institutional investors;50 independent directors and boards’ 
 
47. The discussion here regarding increasing shareholder input on certain issues is reminiscent 
of the discussion by Bebchuk and Jackson on increasing shareholder input on corporate political 
speech. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010). They even point out the relevance of their argument to social issues implicated 
in this Article, such as corporate charitable contributions. See id. at 91 n.21. Yet, there is a significant 
difference between the grounds for increasing shareholder involvement in their article and the one in 
this Article. They point to the importance of the issues at hand and to the fact that they are not 
necessarily connected to the corporations’ core business, without pointing to a systematic gap between 
shareholders and managers on those issues. Id. at 89–91. This Article goes a step further and points to 
the systematic gap between the preferences of shareholders and managers serving as a stronger 
justification for increasing the input of shareholders on such issues. 
48. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 264. 
49. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 34 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1986); Zohar 
Goshen, Controlling Corporate Agency Costs: A United States-Israeli Comparative View, 6 CARDOZO  
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99 (1998); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute 
Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983). 
50. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 819 (1992). In 2003, the SEC adopted rules that required mutual funds to 
develop policies and procedures with respect to voting shares in their portfolio companies and 
disclosing their votes on an annual basis. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.30b1-4; 275.206(4)-6 (2003). 
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independent special committees51 and facilitation of direct engagement of 
shareholders.52 The first two proposals cannot effectively address the agency 
problem in the context of social issues, which leaves only the latter two as viable 
options for addressing this agency problem. This Part will explore the latter two 
options after discussing why the former two will be ineffective. 
The imposition of an enforceable duty of loyalty under which managers are 
obligated to serve the interests of shareholders will be difficult to implement in the 
social context: in order to make an allegation that the officers have diverged from 
the best interests of the shareholders, there must be a clear picture of what the best 
interests of shareholders actually are. Given the wide array of possible objectives of 
shareholders when admitting social goals, it is hard to determine whether officers 
have actually diverged from the shareholders’ interest as a whole. Indeed, even 
under the premise that the only legitimate objective is profit maximization, it is quite 
complicated to determine if officers have diverged from this goal.53 It is much more 
complicated to make such a determination when it could implicate a wide array of 
objectives. 
Institutional investors—who have greater resources and expertise for 
monitoring managers—can reduce this agency problem at the margins, though they 
do not address the core issue: shareholders’ preference ranking of different social 
objectives. There may be funds with a social agenda in which the investor can invest 
and promote some social objective besides profit maximization. A few examples of 
such funds are Parnassus Endeavor,54 Eventide Gilead,55 and funds that invest in 
indexes of socially responsible corporations, such as the Vanguard FTSE Social 
Index.56 Even major conventional funds typically have solid commitments to 
 
51. Regarding the historical shift toward independent directors, see Jeffery N. Gordon, The Rise 
of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
52. There are other mechanisms for addressing agency problems, such as hedge fund activism. 
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure,  
2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 47–49 (2012); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffery N. Gordon, The  
Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113  
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 896–901 (2013). Contra Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1028–41 (2007). Aside from the 
dispute regarding whether hedge funds actually diminish agency problems or might exacerbate them, 
they are not relevant to the context of social objectives. It may seem that other private actors, such as 
Trinity Wall Street in the Walmart case, have a similar function in this context, but this is not accurate. 
The power of hedge funds is mostly derived from the tendency of institutional investors to support 
their campaign. This is not the case for social private funds. Hirst, supra note 19. For this reason, social 
private funds should not be treated differently from any other shareholder, regardless of their size. 
53. Elhauge, supra note 4, at 776–82. 
54. Parnasus Endeavor Fund, PARNASSUS INV., https://www.parnassus.com/parnassus-
mutual-funds/endeavor/investor-shares/[https://perma.cc/8UFC-UZBH] ( last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
55. Eventide Gilead, EVENTIDE FUNDS, https://www.eventidefunds.com/our-products/ 
[https://perma.cc/HMN7-YTDW] ( last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
56. Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund Investor Shares, VANGUARD GROUP,  
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/FundsSnapshot?FundId=0213&FundIntExt=INT&funds_disable_ 
redirect=true [https://perma.cc/V7GW-2RYK] ( last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
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sustainable investing, such as the California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS).57 But without direct shareholder engagement, these funds are not 
chosen to reflect shareholder preferences. A fund devoted to environmental issues 
may not necessarily match the preferences of the investor; it may be more or less 
willing to forgo profit maximization for environmental benefits or even value 
specific environmental benefits differently. When taking into account a wider 
dimension of issues, including gender equality, gun control, and wealth 
redistribution, it is even less likely that the fund’s preferences will match those of 
the investor, particularly given the interplay between various social issues. 
Furthermore, most socially responsible institutional investment funds do not 
engage with the corporation in order to promote and reflect its values, but instead 
divest stock of corporations that do not function in accordance with their own 
values.58 Thus, institutional investors—as actors removed from the shareholders—
are an ineffective tool for steering the corporation from one decision to the other.59 
There are two alternative methods in which decision-making regarding social 
objectives can take place: a bottom-up model, through shareholder proposals 
regarding these issues, and a top-down model, mandating the board to bring certain 
issues to a shareholder vote. Both forms will be discussed, as well as their 
relationship to one another. 
A. Bottom-up: Shareholder Proposals Regarding Social Issues 
Shareholder proposals are a promising mechanism for enabling stockholders 
to voice their social preferences. Shareholders have the right under Rule 14a-8 to 
include their proposals in the company’s proxy materials.60 These proposals can be 
related to any “general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar 
 
57. Sustainable Investing, CALPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/
governance/sustainable-investing [https://perma.cc/W3JB-58G9] ( last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
58. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 266. 
59. In addition to the information problem that institutional investors do not know the 
preferences of their shareholders, there might be an agency problem between institutional investors and 
their shareholders, even when institutional investors are aware of the preferences of their shareholders. 
As a general matter, retail investor support for shareholder social proposals has been found to be 70%, 
and the support of institutional investors in the same study was 27.6%. There is no reason to think that 
there is a systemic difference between the preferences of retail shareholders and investors in those 
institutional investors, supporting the claim that there may be gap in the preferences of the institutions 
themselves and their investors. See Hirst, supra note 19. 
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998). 
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causes.”61 Such proposals are actually used for a wide array of issues: gun control,62 
discrimination,63 environmental justice,64 and social justice.65 
Yet, there is one impediment for the use of shareholder proposals to reflect 
shareholders’ preferences regarding social issues. Rule 14a-8(i)(3) enables the 
corporation to exclude proposals “if the proposal deals with a matter relating to the 
company’s ordinary business operations.”66 This exclusion is fairly wide, and it 
enables the corporation to exclude many public policy proposals. As some scholars 
have noted, this exclusion stands in tension with the permission granted to public 
policy proposals, with one even naming it “a near-perfect bureaucratic Catch-22.”67 
This problem is sufficiently severe that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
has drafted a proposal that would explicitly limit the exclusion regarding public 
policy proposals to apply only when they involve micromanaging proposals.68 
The Capital Cities/ABC Inc. case provides an example for how the ordinary 
business exclusion reduces shareholders’ ability to make public policy proposals.69 
Shareholders in that case proposed that the company would provide information 
regarding the composition of its workforce and employment practices, especially in 
terms of sex and race. The company excluded the proposal from its proxy, claiming 
that the proposal pertained to ordinary business, and was backed by the SEC.70 The 
Commission reaffirmed its position that employment-related proposals should be 
classified as pertaining to the company’s ordinary business and excluded a proposal 
 
61. Proposed Proxy Rules, 36 Fed. Reg. 25,432, 25,432-33 (proposed Dec. 31, 1971) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). The SEC instituted this change in reaction to Campaign GM, in which 
shareholders submitted proposals for the creation of a social responsibility committee. GM excluded 
the proposal, arguing that such considerations were irrelevant to the corporation’s function. The SEC 
required the inclusion of the proposal and changed the regulation in order to clarify that such a proposal 
should not be excluded unless completely detached from the business of the issuer. See Donald 
Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 421, 
423 (1971). 
62. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Shareholder Proposal Developments During 
the 2015 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN ( July 15, 2015), https://www.gibsondunn.com/shareholder-
proposal-developments-during-the-2015-proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/R6B3-LY5R]. 
63. Thirty-four diversity-related proposals have been submitted by shareholders in the 2017 
proxy season. See Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN 
( June 29, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.com/shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2017-
proxy-season/ [https://perma.cc/76Q7-BBCE]. In addition, nineteen proposals regarding pay gaps 
have been proposed. Id. 
64. One hundred forty-four environmental proposals have been submitted by shareholders in 
the 2017 proxy season, of which three have actually been approved by the majority of the shareholders. 
Id. 
65. Fourteen proposals regarding pay disparity have been submitted during the 2017 proxy 
season. Id. 
66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(i)(7) (2018). 
67. See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit 
Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 892 (1994). 
68. Procedural Requirements for Proponents—Rule 14a–8, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,982, 29,984 
(proposed July 20, 1976) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
69. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178633 (Apr. 4, 1991). 
70. Id. 
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from the proxy in a similar decision regarding Cracker Barrel.71 However, the SEC 
has retracted a bit from this apparent blanket limitation on proposals regarding 
employment by redefining “ordinary business” as excluding issues that “would 
transcend the day-to-day business matters and raise policy issues” that are of 
“widespread public debate.”72 While this change of view has enabled shareholders 
to raise employment issues in proposals, it has not diminished uncertainty regarding 
the boundaries between public issues and ordinary business on this issue or within 
other subjects, in what has been described as “an interpretive nightmare.”73 
The uncertainty generated by the ordinary business criterion is a serious 
problem. But there is a much bigger problem regarding this criterion: that in light 
of the justification for why corporations should promote social objectives, it is 
plainly wrong. Shareholder proposals are a means by which shareholders can impact 
the corporation to promote the social objective they support. The central 
justification for why they should promote these social objectives through the 
corporation in which they own shares, and not privately, is that these social 
objectives are inseparable from the corporations’ activities.74 It follows that the 
preference of the shareholder pertaining to the ordinary business course of the 
corporation only reinforces the case for permitting to surface it and does not serve 
as a reason to exclude it. The more a certain social objective is inseparable from the 
corporation’s business activity, the stronger the justification that it should be 
executed by the corporation. The main reason that a social objective is inseparable 
from the corporation’s business activity is that there is a synergy between the 
corporation’s business activity and the promotion of the social objective.75 One 
would expect to find greater synergies as the two are combined more strongly 
together. The strongest combination is when the social objective is woven into the 
heart of the corporation’s business activity—its ordinary business.76 Thus, the set 
of cases where one might expect the rationale for promoting social objectives by 
the corporation to be the strongest are exactly the set of cases in which promoting 
social objectives is strongly restricted under the current rule. 
 
71. Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 289095 (Oct. 13, 
1992). 
72. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,108 (May 28, 
1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
73. Adrien K. Anderson, The Policy of Determining Significant Policy Under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), 93 
DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 183, 196 (2016). 
74. Supra note 19. 
75. See Aseem Kaul & Jiao Luo, An Economic Case for CSR: The Comparative Efficiency of For-
Profit Corporations in Meeting Consumer Demand for Social Goods, 39 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1650, 1651 
(2018). Kaul and Luo focus on the competitive advantage of business to provide the public good at a 
lower cost, but the competitive advantage can also apply to producing a good of higher quality. 
Examples of high-quality public goods that businesses can produce more effectively than the 
government include Microsoft’s partnership with the American Association of Community Colleges in 
forming an education program for IT workers or Marriott’s paid classroom and on-the-job training for 
unemployed individuals. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between 
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV. 78, 89 (2006). 
76. Kaul & Luo, supra note 75, at 1662–63; Porter & Kramer, supra note 75, at 88–89. 
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The case of proposals promoting gender and racial equality provides a sharp 
example. The Commission has restricted proposals regarding employment policy 
because such proposals pertain to the core of the corporation’s ordinary business. 
It is true that employment policy pertains to the corporation’s ordinary business, 
but that is exactly what makes the promotion of that goal in the corporate context 
the most effective way to promote it. One of the key aspects of gender and racial 
equality is preserving the dignity of disadvantaged individuals who suffer from 
discrimination. It is possible to compensate them for the disadvantages and provide 
them with cash grants either in the private or public sphere. But such compensation 
may only further infringe their dignity by underscoring their inferiority to others.77 
Thus, the most effective way to promote equality and preserve disadvantaged 
individuals’ dignity is supposedly in ways that emphasize their value, such as hiring 
them. In this respect, a voluntary commitment of a corporation to hire them is much 
more valuable than a mandate by the State that requires a corporation to hire them. 
With respect to the objective of enhancing their dignity, a legal mandate may be 
self-defeating: hiring as a consequence of a forced mandate by the State does not 
emphasize the value of the individuals from these classes and may even backfire.78 
The Walmart gun prevention case is an additional example of how promoting 
social objectives in the context of ordinary business may generate the desired 
benefit most effectively.79 The decision of which products to sell in Walmart stores 
among the millions of products it sells is a pure ordinary business decision. This is 
why the Third Circuit validated the exclusion of the shareholder proposal.80 Yet, it 
is exactly this business function that controls the gun prevention objective. If 
Walmart were no longer ordinarily involved in the selling of high-capacity 
magazines and weapons, those weapons’ availability would decrease. As Hart and 
Zingales have noted, this may be the most effective way to promote the objective.81 
Since the State may be constitutionally prohibited from imposing shareholders’ 
desired limitations, the corporation controls the most effective target for promoting 
that goal—distribution—and in many cases this target is tied inherently to the 
corporation’s ordinary business.82 
These examples illustrate how the ordinary business context may be the most 
effective venue for integrating business and social objectives. If shareholder 
proposals are the mechanism through which shareholders would be able to express 
their social preferences, the ordinary business limitation must be eliminated. Other 
scholars have made arguments against the ordinary business limitation,83 and 
 
77. LAWRENCE MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN 
AMERICA 194 (1992); Anderson, supra note 26; Frank Munger, Dependency by Law: Poverty, Identity and 
Welfare Privatization, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391, 410 (2006). 
78. Munger, supra note 77. 
79. Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015). 
80. Id. at 344–45. 
81. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 249. 
82. Id. 
83. See supra notes 67, 73. 
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proposals have been made unsuccessfully by the SEC.84 This Article adds an 
additional argument as to why the limitation should be repealed in the context of 
social proposals.  
While this argument does state that the range of shareholder social proposals 
should be extended to ordinary business issues, it does not intend that shareholder 
proposals should not be restricted. On the contrary, it may support some 
restrictions that other scholars have been opposed to. An example is proposals 
related to risk. In 2005, the SEC applied the ordinary business limitation to 
proposals dealing with risk issues that focus on “an internal assessment of the risks 
or liabilities that the company faces as a result of its operation that may adversely 
affect the environment or the public’s health.”85 Yet in 2008, it retreated from this 
ruling, stating that the limitation may have been too broad, causing an “unwarranted 
exclusion of proposals that relate to the evaluation of risk but . . . focus on 
significant policy issues.”86 
With respect to proposals regarding financial risks and liabilities, the 
implications of the Article’s argument would conflict with the SEC’s decision. The 
SEC would apply the ordinary business limitation to proposals regarding these 
issues. If the main function of shareholder proposals is surfacing preferences in 
which there is a potential systemic gap between shareholders and managers,87 the 
ordinary business limitation should not apply to issues regarding financial risks. On 
issues that impact the corporation’s financial bottom line, there is no systemic gap 
between shareholders and managers. The fact that managers address certain risks in 
ways that some shareholders disagree with is not due to a systemic disregard for 
financial risks but because their assessment of the risks differs from those of the 
specific shareholders making the proposal. A proposal based on a differing view 
from management’s professional assessment of the financial risks facing the 
corporation should be covered by the ordinary business limitation. It second-
guesses management’s discretion regarding the corporation’s core business issues, 
where there is no systemic gap between shareholders and managers that leads to a 
misalignment of preferences.88 
 
84. Procedural Requirements for Proponents—Rule 14a–8, 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,982, 29,984.  
85. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14C (CF), ( June 28, 2005); see also Appendix ( listing Staff 
letters permitting inclusion of proposals regarding health and environmental concerns and 
consequences from 2000 to 2007). 
86. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (CF) (Oct. 27, 2009). 
87. See supra note 19. 
88. Some scholars note that there is also a systemic gap in the preferences of stockholders and 
managers towards risk, but that gap is in the opposite direction—managers are more risk-averse because 
of their low diversification and stockholders are risk-lovers because of their diversification. See Yakov 
Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL  
J. ECON. 605 (1981); Goshen, supra note 49, at 103. Yet, shareholder proposals regarding risks do not 
stem from this gap—shareholder proposals are mostly for decreasing rather than increasing risk. See 
GIBSON DUNN, supra note 63. 
Final to Printer_Libson (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  10:14 AM 
2019]  TAKING SHAREHOLDERS’ SOCIAL PREFERENCES SERIOUSLY 719 
B. Top-down: Board Committee that Identifies and Delegates Social Matters  
to Shareholders 
An alternative to relying on shareholder proposals is establishing a committee 
on the board, one which identifies potential significant social issues that 
shareholders would be interested in promoting even at the expense of profits. The 
committee would not make unilateral decisions regarding these issues but would call 
for shareholder input before making decisions on the issues. Even if the committee 
is fully independent, it could not make the decision itself because the appropriate 
decision depends on the preferences of the shareholders. 
There are two forms in which the committee could channel the input of 
shareholders. The first is through a formal vote—with proxy material and all other 
formalities. Such a vote would be binding and would require the corporation to act 
according to the outcome of the vote. The second is through an informal vote. The 
committee can choose to poll only a fraction of shareholders to get an impression 
of their preferences regarding the social issue. This informal procedure is much 
cheaper because it neither requires proxy materials nor attempts to reach all 
shareholders. This form, therefore, suits decisions that must be executed in a short 
time frame. It is also a more fitting form for treating shareholder feedback as non-
binding. 
Soliciting shareholder preferences, even when these preferences are non-
binding, may still be an effective tool for prescribing the corporation’s actions. This 
can be a similar mechanism to that of say-on-pay, in which stockholders voice their 
view regarding compensation packages and affect compensation decisions even 
though their views regarding the compensation package are non-binding.89 Using a 
“soft-law” reputational device may be especially fitting in the case of determining 
the actions a corporation should take in order to promote a certain goal. In complex 
situations, an inflexible rule to determine what course of action should be taken is 
ineffective. In such situations, it is better to utilize softer mechanisms.90 This is the 
ground for excluding shareholders’ proposals regarding ordinary business activity; 
business decisions are highly context-sensitive, and thus, determining by a simple 
maxim how the corporation should act is not appropriate.91 Setting a vague principle 
is also impractical and costly, requiring the regulator to constantly be involved in 
“elaboration costs.”92 Thus, a reputational device, such as a non-formal vote or poll 
of shareholders, may be especially appropriate in the context of providing the 
corporation with the objective it should strive to promote; it leaves some flexibility 
 
89. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 240, 249 (2003). 
90. Poonam Puri & Simon Kupi, Say on Pay, Soft Law and the Regulatory Focus on Enforcement 
and Transparency, in THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND THE 
ROLE OF SOFT LAW 172, 185 (Friedl Weiss & Armin J. Kammel eds., 2015). 
91. Id. 
92. Julia Black et al., Making a Success of Principles-Based Regulation, LAW & FIN. MKT. REV., 191, 
201 (2007). 
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for the corporation but makes it fully accountable for unjustified ignorance of 
shareholder preferences.93 
Soliciting shareholder preferences may have an additional effect to the 
reputational one: it may give rise to a duty of loyalty and duty of care for directors 
and managers to pursue the objective the shareholders have expressed. Managers 
and officers owe a duty of loyalty and duty of care toward the corporation. But 
under the shareholder primacy framework, the ultimate goal of the corporation is 
to promote shareholder welfare. Unless shareholders voice special preferences, it is 
assumed that their preference—and as a consequence, the corporation’s objective 
that the managers and directors have a duty to promote—is maximization of 
profits. When they express other preferences, this may also affect managers’ duty 
of care and duty of loyalty, which may now require them to promote the objective 
expressed by the shareholders. It may be possible that the managers will be liable 
even if they maximize profits, if they neglect the objectives expressed by the 
shareholders.94 It is certainly possible that the expressed preference of the 
shareholders will alter the substance of the duty of care and duty of loyalty. Yet the 
actual effect of such change is quite questionable. Even when there is one clear 
objective—maximization of profits—the business judgment rule virtually nullifies 
the duty of care, making it impractical to impose liability as a consequence of 
violation of the duty.95 The business judgment rule will most likely apply to some 
extent in cases in which the manager has pursued certain interests of shareholders, 
such as maximization of profits, but not their ultimate interests, such as promotion 
of social objectives. Thus, it would be highly unlikely that any liability will be 
imposed on managers and directors based on shareholders voicing their 
preferences. 
The function of the committee proposed here is different from that of a 
standard social responsibility committee. The function of a standard social 
responsibility committee is to engage the corporation in as many social activities as 
is feasible.96 The performance of such committees is evaluated in accordance to the 
amount of social activities the corporation engages with: the more, the merrier.97 
For example, studies evaluating the efficacy of social responsibility committees have 
used the listing of the corporation on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index as a proxy 
for its efficacy.98 The inclusion in the Index is based on public information and 
questionnaires it receives from companies regarding their environmental and social 
 
93. Puri & Kupi, supra note 90, at 222–24. 
94. Hart & Zingales, supra note 2, at 263–64. 
95. Elhauge, supra note 4, at 739. 
96. For an example of a study which assumes that the function of the social responsibility 
committee is to “positively impact corporate social performance,” see Edian Eberhardt-Toth, Who 
Should Be on a Board Corporate Social Responsibility Committee?, 140 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 1926, 
1926 (2017). 
97. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 420, 430 (1991). 
98. Eberhardt-Toth, supra note 96, at 1929. 
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practices.99 As a company invests more in these dimensions, it will receive a higher 
score that will enable it to be included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index.100 
The function of the committee proposed in this Article and the measurement 
of its efficacy are different. The committee’s function is to make sure that 
shareholders’ voices are heard on social issues and not necessarily that the 
corporation should act to promote social objectives. Its efficacy can be measured 
by alternative indicators, such as the number of times the committee has passed on 
certain issues to shareholders. 
These functional differences have an important implication regarding the 
desired structure of the committee. For both types of committees, it is desirable that 
members will be independent.101 Yet for a conventional social responsibility 
committee, it may be desirable that the board’s chair be part of the committee and 
that its membership be drawn from the senior members of the board.102 The reason 
for this is that the main function of the committee is influencing the corporation’s 
decision-making, so it is important that the committee be comprised of the most 
influential members of the board.103 This is not the case in the type of committee 
suggested in this Article; its main function is not influencing the decision makers in 
the corporation but making sure that the voice of shareholders will be heard 
regarding certain issues. Thus, the clout of the directors on the committee is much 
less significant. Furthermore, it may be desirable that such prominent members of 
the board not sit on the committee. Influential board members, such as the 
chairman, are less independent than other members. Even if the chairman is 
formally independent, he is more susceptible to capture by the CEO.104 Thus, the 
degree of influence of board members may be inversely correlated to the degree of 
their independence. If influence is not as crucial for the committee proposed in this 
Article, it is better that the degree of independence not be traded off for it. 
This top-down model does not necessarily decrease the engagement of 
shareholders on these issues. While it seems that in and of itself it does not permit 
shareholders to independently raise social issues they would like to address, the 
model may still increase the impact of shareholders. More shareholders may be 
willing to be involved and support a social issue that a formal sub-committee of the 
corporation has raised in comparison to supporting that issue in the context of a 
shareholder proposal made by an individual who has a personal obsession for a 
 
99. Measuring Intangibles: RobecoSAM’s Corporate Sustainability Assessment Methodology, 




101. Eberhardt-Toth, supra note 96, at 1927. 
102. Id. at 1927-28. 
103. Id. 
104. Bevis Longstreth, Boards Fail When Executives Are Captured, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/8dc26bb4-cf1a-11e5-92a1-c5e23ef99c77 [https://perma.cc/8ZEE-
FMJX]. 
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certain issue.105 This might even be the case when the shareholder is an active 
investor, such as a fund, because it is an actor without a formal function in the 
corporation. The main advantage of this format of shareholder engagement is that 
it sifts out the noise of unserious proposals. The flood of proposals, including those 
that are completely superfluous, is one of the major critiques of the shareholder 
proposal mechanism, as each proposal necessitates the cost of adding it to the proxy 
material.106 The top-down mechanism addresses this disadvantage of the alternative 
bottom-up mechanism. 
It is possible to combine both mechanisms so they will complement each 
other: enable both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms for shareholder input on 
social issues. It may seem that the major benefits of the top-down mechanism will 
evaporate under such a combination: seemingly it will not eliminate the flood of 
proposals, for example. Yet, it may be that instituting a sub-committee that is 
supposed to elicit views on social issues will reduce overall shareholder social 
proposals, given that a dedicated outlet exists for those views. By appointing a sub-
committee whose main function is to oversee such issues, shareholders will be 
“relieved” from their “guarding” duty and will not generate such proposals 
independently. 
The question of which of these mechanisms is more effective and whether 
they are actually complementary is an issue best determined by empirical analysis 
examining the magnitude of each of the effects discussed above. 
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
There are three main objections to the framework for justifying and facilitating 
corporate engagement with social objectives laid out in this Article. The first is that 
shareholders may actually be less social than managers. The second is that even if 
shareholders are more sensitive to social objectives than managers, they may be too 
sensitive, exceeding the socially optimal level of a corporation’s engagement in 
social activities. The third is that the delegation of social issues to shareholders will 
decrease the possibility to detect potential synergies between social and business 
activities. 
 
105. This is supported by the finding that retail investors are mostly pro-management in their 
proxy voting. See Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 15 (2017). 
106. See Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable 
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 177 (2001) (pointing to the fact that the 
costs of the proposals are not justified: they have no positive effect—only seldom do they receive a 
majority and do not have a positive impact on stock price). In addition to Roberta Romano, proponents 
of a director-centered approach to corporate law object to enhancing shareholder proposals or any 
other enhancement of shareholder powers. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006); Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder 
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 623–24 (2006); Stephen Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice  
and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 985 (2001); Martin Lipton &  
Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 
59 BUS. L. 67 (2003). 
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A. Are Stockholders Actually More Pro-social Than Managers? 
The argument of this Article is based on the premise that shareholders tend 
to be more social than managers. Not all scholars agree with this analysis. For 
example, Einer Elhauge argues that dispersed shareholders are less social than 
managers.107 The idea is that dispersed shareholders are insulated from social and 
moral norms and sanctions, while managers are not. Social preferences are mostly 
generated by exposure to these social and moral norms.108 Greater exposure to the 
social norms and sanctions that pertain to a certain situation increases the likelihood 
that one would take the proper action.109 For example, direct connection with a 
worker in poor conditions motivates improving his work conditions. There is a 
difference in the social sanction for someone directly exposed to a situation calling 
for action and someone only indirectly exposed to the situation. People will view 
differently individuals who are exposed to such hardships, have the power to amend 
it, and yet do not do anything in comparison to those who have not been exposed 
to the situation directly. As a consequence, managers who are more exposed to 
social norms and sanctions are more prone to making pro-social decisions. Elhauge 
argues that in order to enhance corporations’ engagement with social issues, which 
he too believes is optimal, managers should have more discretion regarding these 
issues.110 In most cases, a manager’s central function is pursuing shareholder 
welfare. Yet, because these social and moral norms and sanctions have an important 
role in complementing formal legal norms, managers’ greater exposure to these 
social and moral norms and sanctions align their interests in this domain with the 
social interest.111 
There are two responses to Elhauge’s assertion that managers are more social 
than shareholders. The first is that Elhauge’s comparison between managers and 
shareholders takes into account only the gap in their pay-offs from social decisions. 
Even if one agrees with Elhauge’s analysis regarding that social gap, nothing can be 
inferred regarding the likelihood that managers will make social decisions without 
an analysis of the gap for the alternative profit-maximizing decision. Even if 
managers derive greater benefits than shareholders from social decisions, if they 
derive even greater benefits than shareholders in profit-maximizing decisions, they 
will still tilt toward profit maximization. What matters is their relative benefits from 
the two types of decisions. As explained above, managers derive substantial benefit 
from profit-maximizing decisions, due to bonding mechanisms and the 
nondiversification of managers’ human capital. 
However, Elhauge’s argument poses a parallel problem for the argument in 
this Article and to Hart and Zingales’s premise as well. Pointing to the greater 
 
107. Elhauge, supra note 4, at 796–805. 
108. Id. at 740. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 796. 
111. Id. 
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benefits of managers from profit-maximizing decisions does not imply anything if 
they may have even greater benefits from social decisions. Furthermore, one can 
argue that even in respect to profit-maximizing decisions, the value of such 
decisions to managers may be lower than shareholders. If the value-maximizing 
decision is regarding a risky project in the far future, its value to managers may be 
lower than that of shareholders: managers are more conservative in their risk 
preferences because of their lack in diversification. As a consequence, they may 
attribute lower value to future risky projects, and may be more willing than 
shareholders to trade off such projects for social purposes. The central question is 
which of the managers’ benefits is greater in comparison to the stockholders’: 
profit-maximizing decisions or social decisions? 
The evidence seems to point to the former. Data regarding activist 
engagement of shareholders reflects that shareholders mostly press corporations to 
enhance their promotion of environmental and social goals, rather than to decrease 
their investment in social and environmental objectives.112 From the 916 
shareholder proposals in the 2016 proxy season, 299 were aimed at enhancing the 
corporation’s engagement in promoting social and environmental objectives.113 
Among the environmental proposals, the most common proposals focused on 
emissions, especially greenhouse gas emissions, and monitoring the companies’ 
compliance with the Paris Climate Accord’s goal of keeping the global temperature 
increase below two degrees Celsius.114 Other proposals are focused on diversity (59 
proposals),115 limiting operation in conflict zones (17 proposals),116 and a 
sustainable minimum wage (6 proposals).117 If Elhauge’s thesis that managers 
benefit more from social decisions were true, one would expect to find at least a 
similar number of proposals in the other direction, in which shareholders propose 
scaling down social objectives. However, of the 916 proposals, none are of this 
nature. This data regarding proposals is partial—in most cases the majority votes 
are against the proposals. Submission of a proposal requires a single shareholder to 
execute. Yet one would expect symmetry in the submission of proposals between 
 
112. Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2016 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN ( 2016), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/Shareholder-Proposal- 
Developments-2016-Proxy-Season.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN8K-MFF7]. 
113. Id. at 5. 
114. Id. at 38. 
115. Id. at 42. 
116. Id. at 43. 
117. Id. at 44. The low acceptance rate of these resolutions does not necessarily represent broad 
shareholder views, but rather the decisions of institutional investors, who control over 70% of the 
stocks traded. As Scott Hirst noted, there is a significant gap between the preferences of shareholders 
and how institutional investors vote on their behalf in shareholder proposals regarding social issues. See 
Hirst, supra note 19, at 231. In polls and actual votes, it appears that over 70% of shareholders support 
such resolutions, but on average only 27.6% of the mutual funds he examined voted for such 
resolutions. See id. at 227, 230. Namely, if votes of institutional investors would have reflected the actual 
preferences of shareholders on behalf of which they hold the shares, many more social resolutions 
would have passed. See id. at 230–31. 
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pro-social goals and pro-profits goals if there weren’t any systemic preference gap 
between shareholders and managers. 
B. Aren’t Stockholders Too Sensitive to Social Objectives, Exceeding the Social Optimum? 
The premise of this Article, as in much of corporate legal scholarship, is based 
in shareholder primacy: the corporation, and its management, should strive to 
maximize shareholder welfare.118 One of the central justifications for this view is 
that the interests of shareholders are aligned closely with the interests of society at 
large.119 This theory is a classic case of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” at work: 
shareholders’ maximization of welfare maximizes social welfare at large. But is this 
necessarily the case in shareholders’ decisions to sacrifice and not promote their own 
welfare? At first glance, the answer to this question may seem simple—the reason 
why shareholders are willing to sacrifice their own financial welfare is because it 
promotes social welfare. Thus, the decision to sacrifice personal welfare should be 
at least as effective in promoting social welfare as decisions to promote personal 
welfare. 
Yet, some may raise the concern that this is not the case when shareholders 
delegate the authority to decide whether the corporation should engage in social 
activity that would sacrifice its own profits. In such cases, their decision will not be 
aligned with the social optimum because of the rational apathy problem. 
Shareholders’ decisions will not reflect a process in which they weigh their costs and 
the corporation’s relative to the benefit for society. The extremely low expectancy 
that their vote would be decisive in any way may make its economic value negligible 
to them, and they may disregard it all together. The value shareholders may derive 
from their voting is not outcome based, but participation based: it is not derived 
from the increase in the expectancy that their preferred policy is more likely to be 
implemented, but from their support of a certain position per-se independent of its 
probability of being actually implemented; their subject sense of responsibility.120 A 
different version of this argument is that the main source of value of the vote for 
the shareholders is its symbolic value, which applies only when they vote for social 
issues. In other words, shareholders value their vote as a means for expressing 
values to which they are committed. Thurman Arnold has pointed out the 
“symbolic” nature to various forms of behavior in the market and its regulators.121 
Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have applied Arnold’s “symbolic” view of market 
and political activity to the realm of corporate governance and the functioning of 
 
118. See supra note 8. 
119. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9, at 36–39. 
120. Hart and Zingales themselves adopt this framework. See supra note 33. See their 
methodological discussion regarding the framework. Supra at 266-70. 
121. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1st ed. 1937). 
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shareholders. In their words: “[T]he battle against managerial agency costs, as 
Arnold would say, is a moral crusade, not a practical one.”122 
The ramification of this view is that shareholders may make decisions biased 
toward social objectives, which may have negative implications for society’s welfare. 
Shareholders might be affected by the high symbolic value of their vote on such 
matters and vote in their favor even if practical considerations—the social benefits 
of the objective versus the corporation’s costs—would caution against it. 
However, even if we accept the possibility of “symbolic” activity that is not 
motivated by practical considerations in the realm of corporate governance and 
activism by shareholders, it should not be a serious concern in regard to 
conventional voting. The cases in which Kahan and Rock had discussed shareholder 
activism as motivated by symbolic consideration differ significantly from 
shareholder voting discussed in this Article. Kahan and Rock have focused on 
activist campaigns for abolishing practices such as poison pills and staggered boards, 
and the adoption of practices such as proxy access. The success of these campaigns 
was feasible, and in many cases these campaigns actually succeeded.123 The symbolic 
value was not attached to the attempt to cause a certain outcome, independent of 
the chances of the attempt to succeed. The symbolic value was attached to the actual 
outcome but over-inflated its actual value.124 In this sense, the symbolic value works 
as a second layer on top of a practice that seems at first to be of practical value, 
inflating its significance.125 The case of individual shareholder voting is different. It 
lacks the first level of the apparent practical importance, and there is nothing to 
inflate. In this sense, the degree of irrationality that the symbolic value needs to 
justify is much stronger and thus seems less relevant and less concerning. 
It is certainly possible that shareholders derive value from the participatory act 
per-se, and not from its impact on the outcome. But it may well be the other way 
around: that managers derive value from their participation in promoting a certain 
goal and not from the value of the goal itself. Prima facie, it seems more reasonable 
that a more active action as executed by managers has higher participatory value 
than a technical action of voting with limited public salience. In order to claim that 
the value to the shareholders stems from participation per-se, one must furnish 
evidence that that is actually the case. It is not self-evident at all. 
C. Ineffectiveness of Corporations in Promoting Social Goals 
Even given that a shareholder can influence a corporation to act in order to 
promote a certain social goal, the corporation may not be able to actually promote 
the goal. The outcome in respect to the social goal, does not depend only on the 
 
122. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 
2036 (2014). 
123. Id. at 2022, 2037. 
124. Id. at 2036–37. 
125. Id. 
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actions of one corporation, but on the equilibrium reached by the actions of all 
corporations. Even if a corporation abstains from executing a socially damaging 
action, it may not diminish the level of the social damage—other firms may execute 
the socially damaging action instead, and the only impact the shareholder initiative 
will have is diminishing the revenue of their company. For example, in the Walmart 
case, the shareholders’ initiative may not have any impact on the quantity of high-
capacity magazines sold, but only on the identity of the seller: instead of Walmart 
selling them, some other retailers would sell them. This is another reason why social 
goals should be promoted through the political sphere and not through the 
corporate sphere: only state regulation can achieve the optimal equilibrium required 
for promoting the social goal. 
It is true that the political process has many advantages over the corporate 
sphere in promoting social goals and in most cases is the appropriate arena for 
promoting such goals. The argument in this Article does not claim that promoting 
social goals through the corporate sphere dominates promoting social goals through 
the political system. It only claims that there may be some cases in which the 
corporate sphere may have an advantage. It is true that there are some strategic 
problems in promoting social goals through the corporate sphere, such as the 
equilibrium problem noted above. But the political sphere pertain failures that 
eliminate its ability to promote certain goals—voting in the political process is over 
candidates and not over policies and social preference, the need to vote for a bundle 
of policies without knowing which coalition will form, and other collective action 
problems that the political system exhibits.126 The argument proposed in this Article 
enables the individual to determine which of the systems is most appropriate for 
promoting her desired goals. If one of the systems is not effective in promoting her 
goal, she would most likely not opt for it. In other words, the argument in this 
Article enables a private-ordering mechanism, through which the individual will 
pick the system that is the most effective for promoting her desired goal. 
D. Upstream / Midstream Changes in the Objectives of the Firm 
One may argue that even if one accepts the central argument of this Article 
and enables firms to promote social preferences, it should be done only upstream—
by being clearly stated at the IPO stage in the charter of the firm as a mechanism 
that enables shareholders to influence the firm to promote social goals.. When such 
mechanisms are adopted mid-stream, after the IPO, they would harm certain 
shareholders that expected that the firm would focus on profits, and now find 
themselves losing value.127 
 
126. Regarding breakdowns in the transmission of individual preferences in the political 
process, see J.M. BUCHANON AND G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULOUS OF CONSENT: LEGAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); J.M. BUCHANON, WHAT SHOULD 
ECONOMISTS DO (1979). 
127. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable 
Constraints on Charter Amendments or Differential Treatment Between Opting in to a Firm’s Charter, and 
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It is true that the proposal would have greater legitimacy if it required the 
shareholder mechanisms to be installed at the time of the IPO. But it doesn’t 
necessarily have to limit itself in that way. Setting a default where the firm has to 
promote profit-maximizing preferences, unless stated otherwise, provides a 
significant benefit to such preferences over other preferences of shareholders. The 
central argument of this Article is that there is no theoretical justification to 
discriminate between the two sets of preferences. It is true that a shareholder that 
preferred value maximization and assumed the other shareholders had the same 
preference, loses out when the other shareholders promote social goals. But the 
same is true to the same extent in the reverse direction: shareholders with pro-social 
preferences that assumed other shareholders had similar preferences lose out 
potentially to the same extent when the other shareholders pursue only profit 
maximization. The main justification for setting one of the sets of preferences as a 
default is empirically based, and not theoretically based: as long as one set of 
preferences is much more common than the other, it is justified that the 
shareholders assumed other shareholders held the more common preference. But 
if the dynamic of preferences keeps on shifting, and more shareholders have pro-
social preferences, the justification for maintaining for-profit preference as the 
default weakens.128 
E. Won’t Delegation of Social Issues to Stockholders Decrease the Synergies from  
Such Engagement? 
One of the primary justifications for corporations to engage in social activity 
is the synergies from combining the business and social activities. Each one of the 
spheres benefits the other: the business sees reputational benefits such as goodwill 
and branding from the social activity, and the social sphere benefits from the 
business’s resources employed for furthering goals in this sphere. Knowledge of 
when and where these mutual benefits take place is extremely complex.129 While 
managers in many cases have the skills to identify these opportunities, it is highly 
doubtful that shareholders have this knowledge.130 Therefore, when making decisions 
regarding the social issues in which the corporation should engage, shareholders might 
 
Opting out of It in the Post-IPO Stage, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989) (distinguishing between 
shareholders’ opting-in decisions in the IPO stage and opting-out decisions regarding charter 
amendments in the post-IPO stage). 
128. One may argue that, even if the preferences are equally common, there is still a strong 
justification for setting one of the preferences as the default in order to maintain stability and that each 
set of shareholder would not find himself in a different company from the one he has invested in. Yet 
stability also has a cost—eliminating flexibility and the ability of the firm to adopt itself to new 
opportunities and to the evolving preferences of its shareholders which aren’t always stable. One cannot 
clearly determine ex-ante which one of the two dominates the other. 
129. E.g., Roy Shapira, Corporate Philanthropy as Signaling and Co-optation, 80 FORDHAM  
L. REV. 1889, 1935 (2012). 
130. Id. 
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not fully take these complex synergies into account. As a consequence, social welfare 
will be reduced, as many of these potential benefits might not be recognized. 
While it is plausible that managers have this knowledge and shareholders do 
not, managers can mitigate this gap by informing shareholders regarding possible 
consequences—positive and negative—of various social courses of action. Most 
likely, such disclosures will not entirely eliminate the gap. Even after receiving such 
information, shareholders are unlikely to fully understand the broad picture of each 
course of action, and thus will not accurately estimate the potential benefits when 
making a decision. Yet, such disclosures will significantly reduce any gap that exists 
and the social cost that results, increasing the likelihood that the benefits mentioned 
in this Article will surpass this limited cost. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article developed Hart and Zingales’s argument justifying a corporation’s 
pursuit of social objectives from within the shareholder primacy framework. It 
underscored the central consequence of the argument for taking into account 
shareholder preferences: generating a new agency problem between managers and 
shareholders. Managers systematically undervalue social initiatives in comparison to 
shareholders and thus will tend toward profit maximization even when shareholders 
clearly prefer to pursue other social objectives. This is due to both their 
nondiversification compared to shareholders and bonding mechanisms that 
increase their sensitivity to profits to a greater degree than shareholders. Hart and 
Zingales have raised the concern that there might be a gap between shareholders 
and managers in regard to social preferences, but did point out the roots for why 
there might exist a systemic gap. This observation has important ramifications: it 
increases the importance of delegating more power to shareholders. For this reason, 
this Article has analyzed more closely the types of methods through which 
shareholder input on social issues could be increased: top-down mechanisms, 
through facilitating shareholder proposals, and bottom-up mechanisms, such as 
delegation to shareholder vote by an independent subcommittee. 
Hart and Zingales’s powerful argument for taking into account shareholders’ 
social preferences should not be rejected due to the new set of agency problems to 
which it gives rise. Rather, this new set of agency problems should be addressed 











Final to Printer_Libson (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  10:14 AM 
730 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:699 
 
 
 
